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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE POLITICS
OF RACIAL RESENTMENT IN THE POST
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
Michael K. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
Public support for the death penalty remains very high today at
64%, even though it has declined slightly from its 1994 peak of 80%.1
Although we are accustomed to think of Americans as relentlessly
predisposed to favor execution despite questions about the fairness of
the death penalty and its uncertain effect in deterring homicides, pub-
lic support has fluctuated significantly over the last fifty-five years.
Support for the death penalty was almost as high shortly after World
War II as it is today, but public opinion turned against the death pen-
alty in the early 1960s, declining to a low of 42% by 1966.2 Since then,
opinion shifted sharply in favor of the death penalty, notably after the
Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976. 3 It is a mistake
to assume that a disproportionate number of Americans have always
been in favor of executing people.
The public's embrace of the death penalty during the late 1960s was
not an isolated occurrence. Since then, public support for increased
punitive crime control measures (i.e., longer, mandatory sentences,
* Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Professor Brown is the
author of several books including WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEM-
MAS OF REFORM (1988); RACE, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1999). His most
recent book is WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003), which he
co-authored with a team of social scientists. Whitewashing Race received the First Annual Ben-
jamin L. Hooks Outstanding Book Award and a Gustavus Myers Outstanding Books Award.
1. Gallup, Death Penalty, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009). The Gallup Poll has asked the same question of respondents since 1953: "Are
you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?" See Tom W. Smith, A
Trend Analysis of Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, 1936-1974, in STUDIES OF SOCIAL
CHANGE SINCE 1948, at 310 (James A. Davis ed., 1976); Lydia Saad, Racial Disagreement Over
Death Penalty Has Varied Historically: Whites Consistently More Supportive, But Only Occasion-
ally Have Majority of Blacks Favored It, GALLUP NEWS SERV., July 30, 2007, available at http://
www.gallup.com/poll/28243/Racial-Disagreement-Over-Death-Penalty-Has-Varied-
Historically.aspx.
2. Gallup, supra note 1.
3. See id. The Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia. See 428 U.S.
153, 186-87 (1976).
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limits on parole and probation), and opposition to means-tested wel-
fare policies also rose.4 A significant portion of the public believes
that the government spends too much money on welfare. At its peak
in the late 1970s and early 1990s, about 63% of the public opposed
more spending for welfare, though opposition to welfare diminished
after Congress enacted the 1996 welfare reform law. 5 Similarly, since
the early 1970s, about two-thirds of the public believes that the gov-
ernment has failed to aggressively suppress crime and has not done
enough to fight drug addiction.6
Contemporary public support for the death penalty, repressive
crime control policies, and hostility toward welfare are part of an ide-
ological and cultural syndrome that defines the post civil rights racial
order; it is a palpable shift in public opinion and ideology.7 It is im-
possible to understand the incarceration boom of the last forty years,
the public's seemingly unquenchable desire for execution, or the re-
peal of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram 8-all key elements of conservative state-building over the last
forty years-without acknowledging and analyzing these broad
changes in public opinion and ideology. Obviously, there is never a
one-to-one relationship between shifts in public opinion and policy
changes, but these policies had and continue to have broad public sup-
port at the same time as they have had devastating consequences for
African Americans. For example, black men are far more likely to be
incarcerated or sentenced to death than white men, and poor African
Americans are more likely to be subjected to harsh, punitive welfare
rules. 9
4. See PAUL M. KELLSTEDT, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN RACIAL
ATTITUDES 78 fig.3.5, 79 fig.3.6, 80 fig.3.7 (2003); JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN
AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS 83 fig.4.5(a) (2d ed. 1999). Kellstedt traces the
changes in attitudes toward the welfare state from the 1950s to 1996. See KELLSTEDT, supra.
5. NAT'L OPINION RES. CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-2006 (Cumulative File),
available at http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/GSS+Website/Download/SPSS+Format (last visited
Feb. 12, 2009).
6. Id.
7. See STIMSON, supra note 4, whose analysis of a wide variety of surveys demonstrates a
conservative shift in public opinion across policy domains including education, urban problems,
health, welfare, and race since the 1960s.
8. In 1996, Congress repealed the AFDC (Title IV of the 1935 Social Security Act), which
legally entitled poor women and their children to cash payments, and replaced it with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 & 42 U.S.C.); 1935 Social Security Act (Title IV), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620
(repealed 1996). TANF sets time limits on cash payments and imposed tough mandatory work
requirements and sexual regulation. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 43, 51 (2002).
9. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL, WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLORBLIND
SOCIETY 147 (2003) [hereinafter BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE]; Joe Soss et al., The
646 [Vol. 58:645
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The conservative turn in public attitudes toward the death penalty,
welfare, and crime stem mainly from a shift in the views of white
Americans. African Americans and whites are sharply divided over
the legitimacy of the death penalty and have been since the onset of
the civil rights movement. As Figure 1 demonstrates, a majority of
African Americans have generally opposed the death penalty while
the vast the vast majority of white Americans from the early 1950s to
the present favored imposing the death penalty.10
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With the exception of the late 1980s and early 1990s, only a minority
of African Americans, an average of 43%, viewed the death penalty
favorably." Today, about 70% of whites favor the death penalty com-
pared to 40% of African Americans. 12
Hard Line and the Color Line: Race, Welfare, and the Roots of Get- Tough Reform, in RACE AND
THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 225, 225-26 (Sanford F. Schram et al. eds., 2003); BRUCE
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 15-18 (2006); Glenn C. Loury, Why Are
So Many Americans in Prison?: Race and the Transformation of Criminal Justice, 32 BOSTON
REV. 7, 9 (2007); LowC Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 95, 96 (2001). For an account of African Americans' relationship to the
U.S. welfare state from its inception in the 1930s to the 1980s, see generally MICHAEL K.
BROWN, RACE, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1999) [hereinafter BROWN,
RACE MONEY].
10. See Smith, supra note 1, at 271 tbl.3; Saad, supra note 1.
11. Average calculated by author.
12. Saad, supra note 1.
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A similar racial divide exists over welfare spending; between 1973
and 2006, an average of 51% of whites thought that the government
was much too generous to welfare recipients while only 28% of blacks
agreed. 13 In fact, historically African Americans are far more likely
than whites to support increased spending for social policies such as
welfare, food stamps, health care, and Social Security. It is not that
white Americans are opposed to the welfare state; on the contrary,
they tend to favor Social Security and Medicare and have consistently
supported helping the poor, albeit with guaranteed jobs rather than
cash handouts. 14
FIGURE 2
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But African Americans, regardless of their class status, consistently
favor more generous social provisions and display far less hostility to-
ward welfare (including food stamps).1 5 Perhaps more significantly,
white attitudes toward the death penalty, crime and punishment, and
welfare are all racially stigmatized. Over the past ten years, a number
of studies have shown that racial attitudes, racist stereotypes, or both
13. See NAT'L OPINION RES. CTR., supra note 5. Percentages calculated by author.
14. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICS 183 tbl.8.1 (1994).
15. See BROWN, RACE MONEY, supra note 9, at 346-48; DAWSON, supra note 14, at 183 tbl.8.1.
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are the most important factors in explaining white support for the
death penalty and white opposition to welfare. 16
With the emergence of the post civil rights political order in the late
1960s, beliefs about race, racial justice, and policies such as desegrega-
tion, affirmative action, and civil rights were fused with beliefs about
the welfare state and the government's role in the economy and soci-
ety. Prior to 1965, there was almost no relationship between welfare
state policy beliefs-defined as a preference for social policies such as
welfare, Social Security, and government regulation-and racial pol-
icy beliefs-consisting of measures of whether the public supported or
opposed civil rights policies. 17 Before the civil rights movement and
the emergence of black protest and riots in Northern cities in the
1960s, the public understood these two kinds of policies to be separate
and unconnected; the correlation between the indices of each type of
policy was 0.03.18 After the 1960s, these beliefs were strongly related
and moved in tandem: Americans' views of the welfare state and ra-
cial policies became more conservative after 1971, and then switched
directions and became more liberal in the 1980s. 19 In the early 1990s,
the public's view again became more conservative.20 After the 1960s,
the correlation between the two indices was 0.68.21 Sociologist David
Garland correctly concludes, "The institutional and cultural changes
that have occurred in the crime control field are analogous to those
that have occurred in the welfare state more generally. 22
In the post civil rights political order white racial resentment but-
tressed an ideology of individual choice and personal responsibility,
which was sustained by widening class and racial inequality. Con-
servative political elites created this racial order by exploiting the
1960s political upheaval to forge an electoral coalition that united
16. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS
OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 2-3 (1999); ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE
PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN 52 (2004); Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A
Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on
Drugs, 1 Du Bols REV. 151, 170-72 (2004); Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resis-
tance: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 51 Am. J. POL. SCI. 996, 1006 (2007); James D.
Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for the Death Penalty: Does White
Racism Matter?, 85 Soc. FORCES 1281, 1290-91 (2007).
17. KELLSTEDT, supra note 4, at 78, 80 tbl.3.3. Kellstedt uses an index that measures whether
the public supports or opposes government policies for education, urban problems, health, and
welfare. Id. at 78. Kellstedt's racial policy index includes items gauging support for affirmative
action, school busing to achieve integration, open housing policies, etc. Id. at 68-69, 142-45.
18. See id. at 80 tbl.3.3.
19. See id. at 78 fig.3.5.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 80 tbl.3.3.
22. Loury, supra note 9, at 8 (quoting David Garland).
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white southerners, religious conservatives, and fiscal conservatives
and was dedicated to rolling back regulation of the economy, repeal-
ing progressive taxation, and ultimately undoing as much of the Great
Society and New Deal as possible. Racial hostility and polarization
were instrumental in bringing this political coalition to power and race
has been foundational to its stability.
Research has shown that stigmatizing media portrayals of blacks as
lazy, dependent on government handouts, and prone to violent crimes
likely bolstered public support for the death penalty, repressive crime
control policies, and punitive welfare policies.23 These media portray-
als, however, are an artifact of and were shaped by the changes in
political discourse wrought by opponents of the civil rights movement
and opportunistic politicians playing the race card. Reporters and edi-
tors, whether print or TV journalists, do not frame their stories and
write their accounts in a political vacuum. The media operates more
often like a political megaphone than an independent voice. While
reporters are not necessarily mere secretaries, recording what politi-
cians tell them, it is the politicians and their adversaries, not reporters
and editors, who set the agenda, identify the issues, and establish the
foundations of political discourse. The words of politicians as they try
to fashion electoral coalitions, defeat opponents, and champion poli-
cies-the political context-matter to the images and stories that the
media produce and reproduce.
Changes in public support for the death penalty, repressive crime
control policies; or punitive social welfare policies will occur only as
this racial order changes. Whether and how it might be changing is an
open question-one I will consider in the conclusion to this Article.
My argument proceeds by first defining the concept of racial orders
and elaborating on the origins of the post civil rights racial order-its
roots in a conservative political movement that exploited white racial
resentment-and analysis of its three constituent elements: durable
racial inequality, widening wealth and income inequality, and the
emergence of racial voting blocs. 24 I argue that racial resentment un-
derpins a contemporary ideology of choice and individualism, which is
linked to the ascendance of conservative crime, welfare, and tax and
budget policies, particularly in the 1980s. 25 Available empirical evi-
23. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 16, at 102-32; CRAIG HANEY, DEATH By DESIGN: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 27-44 (2005); Mary Beth Oliver, Race and
Crime in the Media, in A COMPANION TO MEDIA STUDIES 421, 421-36 (Angharad N. Valdivia
ed., 2003).
24. See infra notes 28-81 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58:645
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT
dence, I suggest, demonstrates that white racial resentment is a key
explanation for whites' political support for the death penalty, tough
anti-crime policies, and punitive welfare policies.26 In the conclusion I
consider whether and how the post civil rights racial order may be
changing.27
II. THE POST CIVIL RIGHTS RACIAL ORDER
What is a racial order and what characterizes the post civil rights
racial order? A racial order is defined as a "social structure where
race is the organizing principle for distribution of material and psy-
chological resources as a well as a racial schema which assigns roles,
scripts, behaviors, expectations, stereotypes, and normative evalua-
tions based on citizens' racial assignment. ' 28 Racial orders affect the
life chances and opportunities of individuals; structure politics, partic-
ularly party competition, and political institutions; and shape ideologi-
cal beliefs and attitudes. Underpinning racial orders are racialized
labor markets that historically have enslaved, subordinated, or ex-
cluded black labor. Given the historical significance of slavery and
Jim Crow laws, both instances of ruthless exploitation of black labor,
it is apparent that racial orders embed a "durable kind of ascriptive
civic status in the context of American capitalism. ' 29 Politicians con-
struct racial orders by forging coalitions, restructuring governmental
institutions, and crafting policies that embed racial hierarchies in
American society and perpetuate white privilege while justifying the
subordination and exploitation of black workers. 30
In any racial order, race and racism, as Thomas Holt notes, "colo-
nize other categories and concepts-like economic rationality and jus-
tice, and notions of value and entitlement. ' 31 In this regard, racial
orders in the United States reflect what Toni Morrison has called
"American Africanism," the construction of a "nonwhite, Africanlike
26. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
28. Michael C. Dawson & Cathy Cohen, Problems in the Study of the Politics of Race, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 488,492 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner
eds., 2002).
29. Adolph Reed, Jr., Unraveling the Relation of Race and Class in American Politics, 15 POL.
POWER & Soc. THEORY 265, 266 (2002).
30. See generally Dawson & Cohen, supra note 28; THOMAS C. HOLT, THE PROBLEM OF RACE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000); Warren Whately & Gavin Wright, Race, Human Capi-
tal, and Labour Markets in American History, in LABOUR MARKET EVOLUION: THE Eco-
NOMIC HISTORY OF MARKET INTEGRATION, WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
270, 270-91 (George Grantham & Mary MacKinnon eds., 1994); Desmond King & Rogers
Smith, Racial Orders in American Political Development, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 75 (2005).
31. HOLT, supra note 30, at 76.
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(or Africanist) presence or persona" and its incorporation into public
ideology and discourse.32 For most of U.S. history, the racialization of
public discourse was explicit, and politicians were expected as a mat-
ter of course to appeal to the opinion and preoccupations of white
men. Abraham Lincoln went out of his way during the famous Lin-
coln-Douglas debates to reassure his white audience that his opposi-
tion to slavery in no way entailed repudiating the privileges of white
men.33 With the repudiation of Jim Crow and the assertion of color-
blind equality after the civil rights revolution, statements of racial and
biological inferiority and subordination were purged from public dis-
course.34 Such statements simply are not tolerated any longer.35 This
does not mean that politicians forgo issuing racial appeals or exploit-
ing racial divisions, however. Today, racial appeals are coded through
implicit references to the fear of black crime or lazy blacks who re-
ceive undeserved handouts.36
In the aftermath of the civil rights legislation and the Great Society,
a powerful legacy of racial resentment has shaped public discourse
and public opinion. George Wallace, Richard Nixon, a multitude of
Republicans, and Southern opponents of civil rights forged a new ra-
cial language by capitalizing on white resentments and fears arising
out of the wrenching political upheaval of the 1960s.37 Whites' resent-
ment toward African Americans or Latinos is often expressed in the
language of individualism. Indeed, we may say that the core Ameri-
can value of individualism has become racialized-whites' antipathy
to blacks or to color-conscious policies is expressed in the language of
individualism. Donald Kinder and Tali Mendelberg argue that whites
use individualism as a political weapon and they are "preoccupied
with matters of moral character. '38 Whites focus on blacks' shortcom-
ings and specifically believe that "blacks fail to display the virtues of
32. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
6-7 (1992).
33. TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND
THE NORM OF EQUALITY 38 (2001).
34. See id. at 18.
35. Id. at 17-18.
36. See id. at 17.
37. THOMAS EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS,
AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 77-79 (1991). See generally EDWARD CARMINES & JAMES
STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989);
MENDELBERG, supra note 33, at 81-84, 88-107.
38. Donald R. Kinder & Tali Mendelberg, Individualism Reconsidered: Principles and
Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion, in RACIALIZED POLITICS: THE DEBATE ABOUT
RACISM IN AMERICA 44, 58, 61 (David 0. Sears, Jim Sidanius & Lawrence Bobo eds., 2000); see
also BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 9, at 34-65.
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hard work and self-sacrifice that white Americans claim as central to
their own lives and to their society."'39
The language of the so-called American Dream-hard work, suc-
cess, and bootstrapping-was joined to white racial resentment, a be-
lief that the civil rights laws and social programs of the Great Society
handed blacks undeserved advantages and privileges they did not
earn. For many whites, there must be some recognition of how people
arrived in the middle class, because "[t]o wipe away .. .symbols of
achievement and security is to undermine significantly the self-interest
and psychic well-being of a major portion of the American middle
class."' 40 Or as one distraught constituent, a "self-described 'staunch
Democrat,"' expressed in a letter to Democratic Illinois Senator Paul
Douglas in the heat of the 1966 elections: "I feel Mr. [Lyndon] John-
son is much responsible for the present riot by his constant encourage-
ment for the Negro to take any measure to assert himself &
DEMAND his rights-Rights, and respect are earned!" 41 Similarly,
Beth Roy shows in her retrospective study of white students at the
Little Rock, Arkansas high school when it was integrated that white
resentment has hardly dissipated in the forty-five years since the end
of Jim Crow. One white woman told Roy, "They think that a lot is
owed to them, they do, they think we owe them. And maybe we do,
but they're getting more and more, you see it on TV, they're getting,
they're getting, they're being given, given, given, and that makes us
bitter. '42 A study of white racial attitudes in the 1980s revealed that
on average about 60% of whites think blacks received advantages
they did not deserve.43
The post civil rights racial order is based on formal equality before
the law and a public ideology of color blindness. It combines persis-
tent racial inequality with deep and widening inequalities in wealth
and income. The political fulcrum of this racial order is the post-1960s
electoral realignment of the political party system on the basis of ra-
cial issues. The New Deal electoral re-alignment of the 1930s was a
class alignment; it forged a political coalition of Northern workers
39. Kinder & Mendelberg, supra note 38, at 60.
40. DONALD I. WARREN, THE RADICAL CENTER: MIDDLE AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF
ALIENATION 174 (1976).
41. RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACrURING OF
AMERICA 117 (2008).
42. BETH Roy, BITTERS IN THE HONEY: TALES OF HOPE AND DISAPPOINTMENT ACROSS DI-
VIDES OF RACE AND TIME 305 (1999).
43. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 107 tbl.5.1 (1996).
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with white Southerners.44 The viability of this coalition depended on
the Democrats intentionally suppressing racial issues, leaving Jim
Crow intact. President Franklin Roosevelt avoided racial issues, even
refusing to support an anti-lynching law, and agreed to the exclusion
of agricultural and domestic workers from New Deal social and labor
policies in exchange for the votes of southern legislators. 45 Only as
blacks moved North where they could vote, and World War II pro-
duced the racial consciousness that led to the civil rights movement,
did the Democratic Party begin to address the exclusion and subordi-
nation of African Americans. Beginning with the 1964 election, the
parties split over racial issues leading to a durable shift in partisan
identification and the emergence of racial voting blocs.46 After the
1960s, a racial cleavage bisected the electorate and cross-cut the origi-
nal New Deal realignment.47
In exploring the connection between public opinion and white racial
resentment in the post civil rights era, I am not making a causal argu-
ment so much as I am trying to understand the genesis and implica-
tions of contemporary conservative political discourse. There is a
relationship between political support for the death penalty and crime
control policies such as "three strikes and you're out," the 1996 wel-
fare reform law, and other staples of the Republican political agenda,
such as tax cuts and the repeal of the estate tax.48 Conservative politi-
cal discourse and racial resentment are linked through an ideology of
choice and individualism, which is nourished by racial inequality and
racial competition for jobs, education, and the accouterments of the
American Dream. Forged by conservative political elites in the after-
math of the civil rights revolution, this link percolates down to and
shapes public sentiment. In a nutshell, racial inequality and the re-
sentment of efforts to remedy it is one of the roots of an ideology of
choice and personal responsibility that appeals to the values of ordi-
nary Americans. At the same time, widening class inequality and the
racial competition it exacerbates intensify racial inequality. To under-
stand this link analytically, it is necessary to explore the three constit-
uent elements of the post civil rights racial order in more detail.
44. See generally BROWN, RACE MONEY, supra note 9.
45. See generally id. at 1-28, 61-96 (providing a summary on blacks and the New Deal); IRA
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (also providing a summary on blacks
and the New Deal).
46. See generally CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 37.
47. Edward Carmines and James Stimson provided a detailed analysis of this transformation.
See id.
48. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
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A. Durable Racial Inequality (DRI)
Deeply embedded racial inequalities in income, employment, access
to public social welfare, and residential segregation persist after pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act. Individual African Americans have suc-
ceeded economically in the last forty years largely because of the civil
rights laws, affirmative action policies, and the growth of federal social
programs. Yet persistent economic inequality between blacks and
whites define the limits of the civil rights revolution.49
The facts are not in dispute. Indeed, it is now understood that the
racial gaps in income, wages, and employment are much larger than
usually reported because imprisoned black men and women are ex-
cluded from the government statistics.50 Black family income at all
levels remains considerably lower than white family income. In 2006,
the median black family income was 58% of white family income, only
slightly higher than it was in 1980 (56%). 51 The average income of
black families in the bottom 20% of the income distribution was about
45% of similarly situated whites. 52 Black families in the top 20% of
income made about two-thirds of what similar white families earned. 53
Between 1980 and 2006, the absolute dollar gap in median family in-
come grew by $5000 between blacks and whites.54 As of 2006, the
black poverty rate remained about three times higher than the white
poverty rate (24.3% to 8.2%).55
Despite economic gains, blacks experience less upward mobility
than whites and, at least by some accounts, more downward mobility.
A racial mobility gap exists such that at any given level of income, the
probability of black children moving up is lower than that of white
children. One economic study shows that even when their parents
earnings were similar, the incomes of black children are about 33%
lower than white children, and this cannot be explained by family
49. See generally BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 9, at 34-65.
50. See WESTERN, supra note 9, at 87-88.
51. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table F-5. Race and Hispanic Origin of Householder-Fami-
lies by Median and Mean Income, in HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-FAMILIES (2009), available
at http://www.census.govlhhes/www/income/histinc/incfamdet.html [hereinafter Table F-5].
52. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5
Percent of Families, in HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-FAMILIES (2009), available at http://www.
census.govfhhes/www/income/histinc/incfamdet.html
53. See id.
54. See Table F-5, supra note 51.
55. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 2. Poverty Status, by Family Relationship, Race, and His-
panic Origin, in HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES-PEOPLE (2008), available at http://www.cen-
sus.govlhhes/www/poverty/histpov/perindex.html.
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background characteristics. 56 Moreover, blacks experience more
downward mobility than whites. Julia Isaacs found that 45% of black
children born into middle class families end up in the bottom 20% of
the income distribution compared to 16% of white children.5 7
The negative impact of durable racial inequality compounds over
time. Consider the racial wealth gap:
[In 2002] white median net worth was [sixteen] times that of blacks,
and all whites, even those at the bottom of the income distribution,
have a higher net worth than African American or Latino families.
In 2000, for example, the median net worth of white families in the
bottom income quintile was almost $26,000; the median net worth
of African American families in that same income bracket was
$61.58
The economic boom and stock market bubble of the late 1990s did not
change this. Even though blacks made gains in home ownership in the
1990s, 59 the median net worth of black households actually declined.
Between 1995 and 2002, whites' net worth rose by 77.5%, whereas
blacks' net worth declined by 23%.60 If one looks at financial net
worth (excluding housing equity), one finds that white median net
worth increased by 32.5% at the same time that black median net
worth fell by 58.5%.61 Even the modest gain in black home ownership
during the technological bubble in the 1990s has largely been wiped
out by the subprime mortgage crisis.62
56. TOM HERTZ, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN AMERICA 13, 19 (2006), available at http:II
www.americanprogress.org/kf/hertz-mobility-analysis.pdf.
57. JULIA B. ISAACS, ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF BLACK AND WHITE FAMILIES 6 (2007),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/1 lblackwhite-isaacs/11-
blackwhitejisaacs.pdf.
58. See Michael K. Brown & David T. Wellman, Embedding the Color Line: The Accumula-
tion of Racial Advantage and the Disaccumulation of Opportunity in Post-Civil Rights America, 2
Du BOiS REV. 187, 201 (2005); ALFRED 0. GOTTSCHALCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH
AND THE ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS: 2002, at 14 tbl.6 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2008pubs/p70-115.pdf. All calculations made by author.
59. AMANDA LOGAN & TIM WESTRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, AN UPDATE ON THE
STATE OF MINORITIES: KEY INDICATORS SHOW THAT MINORITIES CONTINUE TO FARE POORLY
IN THE CURRENT ECONOMY 5 (2008), available at http:/lwww.americanprogress.org/issues2008/
09/pdf/state_of minorities.pdf.
60. MICHAEL E. DAVERN & PATRICA J. FISHER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD NET
WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1995, at xiv tbl.G (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/200lpubs/p70-71.pdf; GoTrSCHALCK, supra note 58, at 14 tbl.6. All calculations made by
author.
61. See DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 60, at xiv tbl.G; GOTrSCHALCK, supra note 58, at 14
tbl.6; see also Brown & Wellman, supra note 58, at 201-02; MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 107
(10th anniversary ed. 2006). Brown and Wellman's theory of durable racial inequality challenges
reigning conservative and liberal narratives of black poverty and racial inequality.
62. Regardless of income, African Americans were three times as likely as whites to receive
high cost (subprime) mortgages. See ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LEND-
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B. Class Inequality
Durable racial inequality is nested in a widening gyre of class and
income inequality. It is well known that the income and wealth ine-
quality widened substantially over the last twenty-five years as the
wages of middle- and low-income earners have either stagnated or de-
clined while the income and salaries of those in the top quintile have
increased in real dollars.63 This is less attributable to capital gains
than it is to a growth of salaries and entrepreneurial income, which by
1998 accounted for 80% of the income of the top 1% of earners. 64
The new wealth accumulation is driven by the rise in salaries and
changes in compensation, such as providing stock options for CEOs
and top managers in private firms.65 The "working rich" have re-
placed "coupon clippers," and the new crew has every incentive to
hold on to its capital rather than see it taxed away.66
More importantly, income and wealth inequality coincide with a
shift in class structure and changes in the organization of work that
reinforce class inequality. Labor markets are far less secure than
twenty-five years ago. Layoffs, displacement, and part-time tempo-
rary work no longer affect only blue collar workers; white collar work-
ers, even managers, work in a more insecure environment. Insecurity
in labor markets stems from deindustrialization and a shift to "share-
holder value"-driven by the changes in class structure-from stake-
holder rights. 67 The result is an increased volatility of family incomes,
especially during the 1990s; the erosion of public and private safety
nets-a shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions
(401ks), decreasing access to health insurance as costs rise and em-
ployers cut back or eliminate contributions to health plans; and lim-
ING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOME-
OWNERS 23 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-
2-17.pdf; see also Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to
Whom?, at 14 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Working Paper No. 2008-29,
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/2008291200829pap.pdf. Foreclo-
sures are statistically more likely in areas with substantial black populations. See SCHLOEMER ET
AL., supra.
63. See generally Peter Gottschalk & Sheldon Danziger, Inequality of Wage Rates, Earnings,
and Family Income in the United States, 1975-2002, 51 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 231 (2005).
64. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, at
12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8467, 2001).
65. See id. at 26.
66. Id.
67. Neil Fligstein & Taek-jin Shin, The Shareholder Value Society: A Review of the Changes in
Working Conditions and Inequality in the United States, 1975-2000, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 401,
423 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004).
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ited unemployment insurance and anti-poverty benefits.68 Labor
market instability, income volatility, and the shredding of social safety
nets exacerbate and deepen racial inequality. Today, inequality of
wealth, income, and the insecurities of labor markets intensify racial
labor market competition, which in turn, sustains-if not deepens-
durable racial inequality.69
C. Racial Voting Blocs
The third element of the post civil rights political order consists of
racial voting blocs that anchor party coalitions and the accompanying
class compression of the electorate. 70 Between 1972 and 2008, an av-
erage of 40% of white voters cast their ballots for Democratic presi-
dential candidates. As shown in Figure 3, only an average of 37% of
white men over this period voted for Democratic presidential candi-
dates compared to about two-fifths (42%) of white women, although
the vote of the latter is more volatile. 71
In part, these National Exit Poll data reflect the realignment of the
South from a region dominated by the Democratic Party that ex-
cluded blacks, to a region with a predominantly white Republican
Party and an integrated Democratic Party heavily dependent on mo-
bilizing black voters. In the three presidential elections from 2000 to
2008, just 30% of white Southern voters pulled the lever in the voting
booth for Al Gore, John Kerry, or Barack Obama. On average, in the
same three elections, 45% of whites living in the Midwest voted Dem-
ocratic, just 46% did so in the West, but in the East, 51% voted Dem-
ocratic. The Democratic Party failed to win the vote of a majority of
white men in all regions in 2000 and 2004.72
On the other side of the political ledger, African Americans, and to
a lesser extent Latinos, are the only consistent Democratic party vot-
ing blocs in the country. African-American voters cast an average of
87% of their ballots for Democrats over the last ten elections, and
there is little difference between black men and women. About two-
68. See generally JACOB S. HACKER & ELISABETH JACOBS, THE RISING INSTABILITY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY INCOMES, 1969-2004: EVIDENCE FROM THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DY-
NAMICS (2008).
69. See generally Brown & Wellman, supra note 58; WILLIAM DARITY, JR. & SAMUEL MYERS,
JR., PERSISTENT DISPARITY: RACE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1945 (1998).
70. This is true at least through the 2004 presidential election. The 2008 election reveals grow-
ing regional differences in racial bloc voting and racial resentment.
71. These data are drawn from National Exit Polls (on file with author). All calculations
made by author.
72. See supra note 71. Author's calculations are based on 2000, 2004, and 2008 exit poll data.
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FIGURE 3
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY RACE AND GENDER
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thirds of Latino voters consistently support Democratic presidential
candidates. Over the 1990s, the Republican Party became whiter as
Asian Americans shifted from voting solidly Republican to a majority
voting Democratic.73
Race is a more significant division among voters than income. Ra-
cial bloc voting among whites and blacks is relatively independent of
income or social class. Telling data on this point come from the 2004
election.74 In that presidential election, John Kerry received a major-
ity (55%) of white votes only from low-income women, those with
family incomes of less than $30,000 annually. As Figure 4 shows,
among white men, Kerry received 46% of the votes of those white
men earning less than $30,000 annually, 38% of those earning be-
tween $30,000 and $50,000, and only 34% of the votes of white men
with incomes above $50,000 annually.
A majority of working and middle class white men, those with fam-
ily incomes in the second and third quintiles of the income distribution
(from the twentieth to sixtieth percentile), consistently vote Republi-
73. Only 31% of Asians voted Democratic in 1992; however, by 2008, 62% of Asian Ameri-
cans voted Democratic. Author's calculations are based on exit polls of 1992-2008 national elec-
tions. See supra note 71.
74. This data is drawn from the 2004 exit polls and based on author's calculations. Barack
Obama may have won more votes from white working and middle class men than John Kerry,
but the data necessary to update Figure 4 for the 2008 election and verify this is not yet available.
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FIGURE 4
2004 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY RACE AND INCOME
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can.75 In 2004, about 60% of these men voted for the Republican
ticket. Among black men earning up to $100,000, however, Kerry gar-
nered an average of 88% of the vote, and among more wealthy blacks,
72% of the vote. The same pattern is apparent with black women.
The Latino vote is more sensitive to income as significant majorities of
low income Latino men consistently vote Democratic but high income
Latinos cast their vote for Republicans.
Unions, the organizational arm of the New Deal coalition, mitigate
the defection of white men to the Republican Party, but not by much.
Overall, 59% of voters who belong to a union or live in a household
with a union member cast their ballots for Kerry. Only 52% of white
union members voted for Kerry compared to 93% of black union
members and 62% of Latino union members.76 Black churches and
organizations are crucial to the Democratic Party infrastructure.
They, however, are insufficient to counter the defection of white vot-
ers to Republican candidates, the collapse of unions (along with the
defection of white union members), and the emergence of a highly
mobilized religious right. In the 1970s and 1980s, racial animus moti-
vated the religious right as much as hatred of abortion and opposition
75. In 2003, income for white families at the twentieth percentile was $29,000 annually and
$72,000 at the sixtieth percentile. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table F-I. Income Limits for Each
Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families, in HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-FAMILIES (2009), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/fO1N.html.
76. Data are based on author's calculations.
[Vol. 58:645
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT
to textbooks mentioning sex or evolution. In particular, federal denial
of tax exemptions for religious schools outraged southern evangeli-
cals.7 7 Many of these schools were originally set up as white acade-
mies in order to perpetuate segregation.7 8 In fact, one recent study
based on national election surveys from 1976 to 1992 shows that Evan-
gelical Protestants are the "most racist, the least compassionate, and
the most anti-feminist" of religious groups.79
With Richard Nixon's smashing electoral victory over George Mc-
Govern in 1972, racial issues increasingly defined the distinction be-
tween modern liberalism and conservatism. Race, crime, the death
penalty, and social welfare issues became co-mingled and central to
the difference between the Republican and Democratic parties. 80 Al-
though coded racial rhetoric and political ads were less apparent in
the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and submerged if present at
all in 2008, the racial realignment of the 1960s and 1970s remains fun-
damental to any analysis of the post civil rights racial order.
81
III. SOME POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POST
CIVIL RIGHTS RACIAL ORDER
The racial polarization of the electorate reduces demand for redis-
tribution and shifts the political and policy agendas of the two national
parties to the right. Both parties favored tax cuts, retrenchment in
means-tested welfare and some forms of social insurance such as un-
employment compensation (though there remain deep party differ-
ences over social policies other than welfare), and punitive crime
control policies such as the death penalty.8 2 Electoral politics re-
volved around cultivating white voters and assuaging their anxieties,
which is one reason Democrats supported welfare reform from the
mid-1980s on. This is attributable, in part, to the effect of two-party
competition in a racially divided society. Given the ongoing deep ra-
77. Joseph Crespino, Civil Rights and the Religious Right, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING
AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970s, at 90, 90-91 (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer
eds., 2008).
78. See id. at 92-93.
79. John E. Roemer & Woojin Lee, Racism and Redistribution in the United States: A Solution
to the Problem of American Exceptionalism, at 15 (Estudios Working Papers No. 2004/203,
2004). It is certainly possible that these racial attitudes have changed since the early 1990s, but it
is unclear how much.
80. See generally CARMINES & ST1MSON, supra note 37.
81. For an alternate account that emphasizes income and cultural values in explaining voting
divisions, see generally ANDREW GELLMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE,
POOR STATE (2008).
82. Woojin Lee & John E. Roemei, Racism and Redistribution in the United States: A Solution
to the Problem of American Exceptionalism, 90 J. PuB. ECON. 1028, 1044, 1048-49 (2006).
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cial divisions among voters, vying for black votes drives white voters
to the other party, and thus both parties focus their efforts on winning
the hearts and minds of white median voters. This was true after Re-
construction failed in the nineteenth century, and is true of the post
civil rights era. The only difference is that in the 1880s, politicians
used explicitly racist appeals to attract white voters, but in the 1980s,
they relied on implicit racially coded communications. Republicans'
use of the Willie Horton ads in the 1988 presidential contest is the
classic example of this strategy, an appeal that only reinforced the link
between race, crime, and the death penalty.8 3
One might call this a contemporary version of the "wages of white-
ness." W.E.B. Du Bois observed in Black Reconstruction in America
that white workers were compensated for their low wages and ex-
ploitation at the hands of employers through public recognition of
their whiteness.84 They could associate with all classes of white peo-
ple, they had the vote, and they were recognized members of the com-
munity.85  In other words, they were not black.86  Du Bois's
interpretation of Reconstruction is directly relevant to many of the
policy and attitudinal changes of the post civil rights racial order.
Tax and spending policies are a hardy staple of Republican adminis-
trations and are justified as a means to spur economic growth by re-
warding those who work hard and take risks. Republican Party elites
and corporate tax lobbyists fashioned supply side tax cuts in the vola-
tile economic and political climate of the late 1970s-growing unem-
ployment and high inflation-in order to capitalize on the middle
class tax revolt,87 especially the political anger that led California vot-
ers to establish limitations on property taxes when they enacted Pro-
position 13 in 1978. Racial resentment would seem to have little to do
with state or federal tax policy. Yet there is very clear evidence that
racial resentment was one of the most important factors motivating
83. Tali Mendelberg documents the importance of implicit communications and the Republi-
cans' intentional use of implicit racial codes in the 1988 election. See generally MENDELBERG,
supra note 33, at 134-68. Lee and Roemer provide one of the very few empirical tests of a
racialized model of party competition. See generally Lee & Roemer, supra note 82. For a theo-
retical and historical analysis of race and the logic of party competition, see generally PAUL
FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA (1999).
84. See W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 700-01 (Athe-
neum 1992) (1935).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See generally John W. Burns & Andrew J. Taylor, The Mythical Causes of the Republican
Supply-Side Economics Revolution, 6 PARTY POL. 419 (2000).
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California voters to support Proposition 13.88 Furthermore, Woojin
Lee and John Roemer's quantitative study of the effects of race on
party positions shows that race pushes both political parties to the
right on tax and budget policies, overshadowing any effect of income
class. 89 Lee and Roemer estimate that during the 1980s, the two par-
ties proposed reducing marginal tax rates by 11% to 18% because of
what they call "voter racism." 90 They argue that the power of a non-
economic factor such as race explains decreasing tax rates amidst in-
creasing inequality. 91 Between 1980 and 1990 the top marginal tax
rate declined from 37% to 28% and cash transfers declined by almost
20%.92 As Lee and Roemer explain, "some poor citizens may vote for
the party that is anti-redistributive, even if they themselves desire
some redistribution, because that party advocates a position on the
racial issue consonant with their own." 93
Aside from taxes, "law and order" was the signature Republican
issue that grew out of the inflamed racial resentment of the 1960s and
opposition to the civil rights movement. In a recent study of the ori-
gins of crime control legislation, Vesla M. Weaver argues that oppo-
nents of civil rights legislation "shifted the 'locus of attack' by
injecting crime onto the agenda. '94 She concludes that "rivals of civil
rights progress defined racial discord as criminal and argued that
crime legislation would be a panacea to racial unrest. '95 Richard
Nixon rode this issue to victory in the 1968 presidential election, and
Republican governors and legislators delivered the goods. The Re-
publican realignment of the 1980s, particularly in the South, paved the
road to massive incarceration, sentencing guidelines, mandatory
sentences, abolition of parole, and more recently, enactment of "three
strikes" sentencing laws. 96 Southern states have the highest incarcera-
tion rates and number of executions, but Republican governors and
legislatures enacted tougher crime control policies wherever they took
power.97 Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to enact
88. DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFOR-
NIA 170-73 (enlarged ed. 1985).
89. Lee & Roemer, supra note 82, at 1044, 1048.
90. See id. at 1027.
91. See id. at 1027, 1044.
92. See id. at 1042 tbl.2.
93. Id. at 1028.
94. Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 230 (2007).
95. Id. at 265.
96. See WESTERN, supra note 9, at 60, 69.
97. Id. at 60, 66; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT 12 fig.1.4, 77 fig.4.4, 87 fig.4.5 (2003).
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repressive crime control policies between 1980 and 2000. In fact, one
study found that incarceration rates would have been lower had Dem-
ocrats retained their electoral advantage. 98
IV. THE IDEOLOGY OF CHOICE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The conservative realignment and its consequent policies have de-
pended on a link between white racial resentment and a conservative
political ideology in which choice is understood as a form of negative
freedom and is tied to personal responsibility and discipline. The mo-
rality of hard work anchors both. The ascendance of this ideology and
its incorporation into everyday political discussions and speeches is a
real shift in the public discourse, not simply an expression of quintes-
sential American political beliefs. There has been a diffusion of "ide-
ologies of choice" over the last thirty years: school choice, informed
consent, IRAs, and privatization of public goods. In a lecture at the
University of California at Santa Cruz, Mary Katzenstein explained
that the rhetoric of choice and personal responsibility has surged in
State of the Union addresses over the last two decades, peaking in the
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. 99 There are few
politicians today who do not champion personal responsibility and
discipline.
One can see just how the ideology of choice and personal responsi-
bility shaped political discourse by comparing the debate over welfare
reform to justifications for the repeal of the estate tax-opposite sides
of the same ideological coin. Conservatives redefined poverty in the
early 1980s when they argued that the problem of the poor is "now
more a moral one than an economic one."' 00 Welfare reform was
about "public morality," or more precisely, the failure of poor African
Americans to work hard and their "socially irresponsible choices re-
garding education, marriage, work, and crime."101 It was not about
lack of jobs, poor education, discrimination, or anything else that
98. WESTERN, supra note 9, at 69. This is not to say that the Democrats did not move to the
right on crime control; by the 1990s, they were proposing and enacting repressive law and order
policies. See id. at 61. Partisan politics is only one of the factors accounting for the emergence
and consolidation of repressive crime control policies. As Franklin Zimring shows, Southern
execution rates are partly traceable to the distinctively harsh and violent history of lynchings in
the South-a legacy of slavery and a tool of racial repression-and the lingering power of a
vigilante tradition in the South. ZIMRING, supra note 97, at 90, 95.
99. Mary Katzenstein, Incarceration and Ideologies of Choice in the United States, Talk
Presented at the University of California, Santa Cruz (Apr. 18, 2005).
100. Lawrence M. Mead, Social Programs and Social Obligations, 69 Pun. INT-. 17, 19 (1982).
See generally CHARLES MURRAY, LosING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980
(1984).
101. See BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 9, at 67.
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might affect access to jobs and the ability to earn a living wage. Joe
Soss and Danielle LeClair conclude that there is a
coherent public image of welfare recipients as poor women of color
who lack the responsibility and discipline needed to stick to a job or
forego casual sex. This package of perceptions reliably predicts op-
position to welfare spending, opposition to welfare rights, and sup-
port for directive, supervisory, and punitive welfare rules.102
Ange-Marie Hancock refers to welfare reform as an instance of the
"politics of disgust. ' ' 10 3 Welfare' reform became a national issue pre-
cisely because of the salience of these images and the racial resent-
ment it conjured up. It was no accident that Bill Clinton vowed to
"end welfare as we know it" in the heat of 1992 presidential cam-
paign. 10 4 It is not inconceivable that President Clinton signed into law
a more draconian welfare reform bill than he wanted in order to take
the issue off the table in the 1996 presidential election. 10 5
Consider now the thus far successful effort to repeal the estate tax,
or the "Death Tax" as Republicans call it, a law that will benefit only
multi-millionaires and billionaires. One proponent of repeal fulmi-
nated, "This tax should be eliminated because it's unfair. Americans
want to know that if we work hard and save, no matter how much, we
can leave our assets to whomever or whatever we want, not pay half
to the government as punishment for getting ahead. ' 106 According to
Ian Shapiro and Michael Graetz's study, the debate surrounding the
passage of the estate tax repeal centered on an argument about moral-
ity, not economics. 10 7 This issue, pushed by a few very wealthy indi-
viduals, should not have appealed to ordinary working or middle class
voters who would not benefit. Yet a majority of voters, according to
polls, supported a repeal of the estate tax and were impervious to the
distributive consequences. According to Graetz and Shapiro, "what
won the day for the forces of repeal was a moral argument based in
102. Joe Soss & Danielle LeClair, Race, Sex, and the Implicit Politics of Welfare Reform, at
23 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political
Science Association), available at http://www.allacademic.com/metalp-mla-apa.researchcita-
tion/O/8/215/5/p82550_index.html.
103. See HANCOCK, supra note 16, at 6.
104. Bill Clinton's pledge to "end welfare as we know it" can be found in his 1992 acceptance
speech to the Democratic National Convention. See Bill Clinton, 1992 Acceptance Speech to
the Democratic National Convention (July 16, 1992), available at http://www.4president.org/
speeches/billclintonl992acceptance.htm.
105. There was speculation in the national press that the 1996 election was foremost in Clin-
ton's mind when he signed the welfare reform legislation. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, The Cam-
paign: Fulfilling '92's Promise, Capturing a '96 Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A25.
106. Gabrielle J. Roudabush, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A20.
107. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
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the great U.S. tradition of hard work and thrift and an argument that
taxing transfers of wealth at death was an imposition on the American
dream, and the faces that were put on repeal were not the billionaires
... but were, in fact, small business owners."'1 08 Nowhere are the iro-
nies of race and politics more apparent than in the juxtaposition of
plundering CEOs justifying their wildly excessive salaries as the re-
ward for hard work and the condemnation of poor black welfare
mothers for their laziness and lack of discipline.
Supporters justify the estate tax repeal and welfare reform on the
grounds of hard work and meritocracy. The legitimacy and attractive-
ness of these measures to the white middle class depends, in part, on
the powerful legacy of racial resentment in the aftermath of the civil
rights revolution and the Great Society. Martin Gilens has demon-
strated that "the perception that blacks are lazy is consistently the
most powerful predictor of white Americans' opposition to welfare,"
and this attitude underlies support for time limits on welfare pay-
ments. 10 9 Equally salient is the recurrent finding that adoption of
harsh and punitive welfare policies are more likely to be imposed in
states where African Americans make up a significant proportion of
the welfare rolls.'10
Racial resentment is a key element in explaining not just white hos-
tility toward welfare reform prior to 1996, but majority white support
for the death penalty. Lawrence Bobo and Devon Johnson find that
racial resentment is one of the most important factors influencing sup-
port for the death penalty.1" They note, "The impact of racial resent-
ment on support for the death penalty is about twice as large for
Whites as it is for Blacks. ' 112 James Unnever and Francis Cullen also
link white support of the death penalty to racial resentment. They
conclude, "the African American death row inmate encapsulates the
racial animus that symbolic white racists have for those African
Americans they believe intentionally flout the ethos of hard work by
trying to profit through murder."" 3 In fact, states with the harshest
108. Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: An Analysis of the Estate
Tax's Demise, Transcript of a Briefing at the Brookings Institution, at 7 (Mar. 24, 2005), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/events/200503024estatetax.pdf.
109. GILENS, supra note 16, at 77.
110. Richard C. Fording, "Laboratories of Democracy" or Symbolic Politics?: The Racial Ori-
gins of Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 9, at 93.
111. See Bobo & Johnson, supra note 16, at 170.
112. Id.
113. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 16, at 1292.
666 [Vol. 58:645
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT
incarceration policies were also those that imposed the toughest work
requirements for poor mothers. 114
The individualization of racial inequality is due in large part to
whites' belief that African Americans have failed to take advantage of
the equality of opportunity gained with civil rights legislation. Whites'
belief in African-American failure once the legal barriers to economic
opportunity came down and racial prejudice subsided justifies the be-
lief that any remaining racial gaps in income, poverty, or occupation
are the result of African Americans' individual choices about work,
leisure, residence, marriage, and law-abiding behavior. In this view,
much of what is ordinarily understood to be racial inequality is not
that at all. Instead, it reflects an individual's choices to stay in school
or not, to work hard or not, to get married rather than give birth to a
child out of wedlock, or to use drugs or not.
Aided and abetted by political elites who capitalized on the racial
discord of the 1960s, many, but not all, whites who think they have
succeeded on their own came to define themselves in opposition to
blacks who, they believe, do not share their values. Thus, they identi-
fied themselves as successful individuals who are "not black" while
resenting advantages they think blacks have undeservingly received
from public social welfare policies and affirmative action programs.115
This is one, but not the only, explanation for their support for the
death penalty, repressive crime control policies, and punitive welfare
policies.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST CIVIL RIGHTS
RACIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
The implications of this analysis are three-fold. First, cultural and
ideological shifts are central to the generation and maintenance of in-
equality. The ascendance of an ideology of choice and personal re-
sponsibility underpinned by racial resentment mark a change from
beliefs about equality and redistribution arising from the New Deal
and Great Society. It is perhaps no accident that the harsh views of
race and punishment coincide with changes in norms about salaries
and executive compensation-pay gaps that were unheard of thirty
years ago are today blithely justified and considered legitimate, at
least by those who benefit. Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez ar-
gue that changes in compensation could be explained by changes in
114. Soss et al., supra note 9, at 243.
115. BROWN, RACE MONEY, supra note 9, at 348, 351.
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"norms" and not technical factors. 116 They never really define what
kind of normative changes matter and could explain the public's toler-
ance for wildly inflated corporate compensation-at least until the
eruption of the financial crisis in fall 2008. I suggest that public toler-
ance of wealth and income inequality, and the justification of such
inequality, was facilitated by the cultural populism and racial resent-
ment crafted and perfected by Republican politicians. The same could
be said of the receptiveness of middle class or low-income voters to
tax cuts for the rich, or at least their unwillingness to vote against poli-
ticians who champion such cuts, and the imperviousness of whites to
arguments about either the ineffectiveness or unfairness of the death
penalty. Media images of black criminals or welfare recipients am-
plify the post civil rights cultural syndrome but they did not create it.
Second, the ideology of choice and individual failure has little to do
with durable racial inequality. Instead, the persistence of racial wage
gaps, educational differences, and black and Latino poverty feed the
ideology. Durable and cumulative racial inequality is created and sus-
tained by racial group competition and institutional practices, which
fluctuates with economic changes and class inequalities. Discrimina-
tion, according to William Darity, Jr. and Samuel Myers, Jr., is "en-
dogenously linked to the employment needs of non-black males."' 17
In other words, labor market competition between blacks and whites
will intensify during an economic downturn or deindustrialization, as
was readily apparent during the Great Depression. 1 8 Historically,
ample evidence exists that white workers' fear of economic competi-
tion with black workers deflects their anger toward economic elites. 119
Thus, political elites have strong incentives to manipulate this anger.
An early episode of this pattern can be found in colonial Virginia
when Nathaniel Bacon turned the wrath of white yeoman on the fron-
tier against Native Americans instead of the owners of Tidewater
plantations.120 As Edmund Morgan writes, "Discontent with upper-
class leadership [in colonial Virginia] would be vented in racial hatred,
in a pattern that statesmen and politicians of a later age would have
found familiar.' 21
116. Piketty & Saez, supra note 64, at 28-29.
117. DARITY & MYERS, supra note 69, at 58.
118. BROWN, RACE MONEY, supra note 9, at 68-69.
119. See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 13 (1991).
120. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 269-70 (1975). Additional evidence of this pattern can be found during
the labor strife and populist revolt of the 1890s.
121. Id. at 257.
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POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT
In the post civil rights racial order, such race-based competition is
not confined to labor maikets, but extends to competition for what
Fred Hirsch called positional or socially scarce goods. 122 These are
goods that very few can purchase or use. Examples include the beach
front house or the mansion in a gated community. These socially
scarce goods are desirable in part because they define one's status rel-
ative to other groups. While the quantity of national goods grows
with the economy, the quantity of positional goods is static. Because
racial inequality is based on whites' efforts to maintain the relative
hierarchy of white over black, racial group competition is one of the
social forces driving the struggle to acquire positional goods. This
competition is clearly visible in the persistence of segregated housing
markets.12 3 The advent of the "winner take all" society and the hyper-
competition for positional goods and advantage-the scramble for ac-
cess to elite institutions, particularly elite colleges and universities,
and the relentless insecurity of American workers-has unleashed a
struggle for scarce positional goods and fueled opposition to race-con-
scious policies. This opposition is then justified in terms of the ideol-
ogy of hard work and discipline. 124
Third, the post civil rights racial order shows signs of age and divi-
sion and it is breaking up, though how it will change remains an open
question. The failure of President Bush's plan for private social secur-
ity accounts marked the limits of the conservative ideology of choice.
Barack Obama's election to the presidency is widely understood, in
part, as a harbinger of a generational transformation and change. 125
His election also marked the erosion of the racial voting blocs and
thus the breakup of the conservative political realignment of the last
four decades. Nationally, public discussion of race and the racial re-
sentment of the 1970s and 1980s has all but disappeared, mainly due
to generational changes, the dissipation of law and order and welfare
as salient political issues, and the emergence of a new cadre of black
politicians. In fact, racial bloc voting and racial resentment have de-
122. See generally FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1978).
123. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 94 (1993). Massey and Denton observe that whites see
black neighbors as "a direct threat to their social status." See id.
124. Not surprisingly, whites who believe that affirmative action threatens their children's
chances for admission to an elite university are predisposed to be hostile to race conscious ad-
missions policies. KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 43, at 63.
125. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Decisive Victory, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5. 2008, at Al.
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clined everywhere but the South. 126 The 2008 election revealed broad
regional differences in racial bloc voting. A majority of whites in four
Midwestern industrial states, the Mid-Atlantic states, and all New En-
gland states voted for Barack Obama. In the five deep Southern
states between the Atlantic coasts of Georgia and South Carolina and
the Mississippi Delta, however, fewer whites voted for Barack Obama
(17%) than voted for John Kerry in 2004 (20%).127 But even though
racial voting blocs are disintegrating, whether the party system is re-
aligning along other issues, such as class and income inequality, will
not be known for sometime.
The post civil rights racial order leaves a political discourse
anchored in the ideology of personal responsibility and discipline
along with a legacy of institutional machinery-the machinery of the
death penalty that will continue to put people on death row and exe-
cute them; the machinery of incarceration that drives up incarceration
rates as the crime rate plummets; and the machinery of workfare that
grinds on. The economic crisis of 2008-2009 has shifted political dis-
course. One of the notable characteristics of President Obama's
speeches is his skill in turning the language of personal responsibility
against bankers and CEOs. Yet the development of the post civil
rights racial order is an instance of state building that will not be easily
dismantled in the future. That alone ensures that race will continue to
shape our political discourse and elections.
126. On the decline of racial resentment outside the South, see generally Nicholas A. Valen-
tino & David 0. Sears, Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in
the Contemporary South, 49 AM. J. POL. Sci. 672 (2005).
127. See supra note 71. All calculations are made by author.
670 [Vol. 58:645
